The reintroduction of capital punishment in 1976 that ended the four year moratorium on executions created by the Supreme Court in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia has permitted researchers to employ state level heterogeneity in the use of capital punishment to study deterrent effects. However, no scholarly consensus exists as to their magnitude. A key reason this has occurred is that the use of alternative models across studies produces differing estimates of the deterrent effect. Because differences across models are not well motivated by theory, the deterrence literature is plagued by model uncertainty. We argue that the analysis of deterrent effects should explicitly recognize the presence of model uncertainty in drawing inferences. We describe methods for addressing model uncertainty and apply them to understand the disparate findings between two major studies in the deterrence literature, finding that evidence of deterrent effects appears, while not nonexistent, weak.
Introduction
This paper explores the strength of evidence on the deterrent effect of capital punishment with specific attention to recent studies on this question. Its goals are both methodological and substantive. In terms of methodology, we argue that an important difficulty with studies of capital punishment is the failure to address systematically model uncertainty; we offer suggestions on how model uncertainty can be addressed. In terms of substance, we perform a set of exercises that show how these methods can be used to address differences between studies.
Our results help to explicate a significant disagreement in the empirical literature.
The new wave of research on capital punishment and deterrence is based on the data that have become available following the reintroduction of capital punishment in different states beginning in 1976, after a four year moratorium on death sentences and executions resulting from the US Supreme Court Decision in Furman v. Georgia.
2 Not all states reintroduced capital punishment at the same time when the decision in Gregg v. Georgia 3 lifted the Constitutional barrier: they acted at different times to restore capital punishment and have used it at widely varying rates ever since. The resulting natural variation in execution rates across states and time forms the empirical basis for these studies.
This new body of work has failed to produce a consensus on whether deterrent effects are present. Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd (2003) , Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2006) , and Mocan and Gittings (2001) find strong deterrent effects from the death penalty. These claims have been challenged by Donohue and Wolfers (2005) , Berk (2005) , and Fagan (2006) , who argue that the evidence that has been adduced in favor of strong deterrence effects is fragile, in that they may be reversed by small changes in model specification. Other studies have argued that more substantive differences in the formulation of the deterrence mechanism lead to different results. Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich (2001) , focusing on the fact that executions are relatively infrequent, argue that prison mortality rates represent a deterrent whereas capital punishment does not. Other studies find that deterrence effects are heterogeneous, so that important properties are masked by imposing a single measure on the statistical analysis.
2 408 U. S. 283 (1972) .
3 428 U. S. 153 (1976) . Shepherd (2005) draws mixed conclusions, suggesting that capital punishment will raise murder rates when the number of executions is small, producing what she calls a brutalization effect.
However, the brutalization effect is dominated by the deterrence effect when the number of executions exceeds some empirically identified threshold. Hjalmarsson (2006) explores whether executions have short run local deterrence effects by studying the city level effects using daily frequency data; focusing on Texas, she finds little evidence of deterrence.
The different empirical studies of deterrence have much in common. They are based on a common choice-theoretic version of criminal behavior advanced by Gary Becker and implemented in the capital punishment context by Isaac Ehrlich (1975 Ehrlich ( , 1977 . All the studies reflect the common idea that criminal behavior reflects a purposeful calculation of its benefits and costs. For the study of murder and capital punishment, a choice-theoretic model leads different researchers to employ qualitatively similar factors in understanding how individuals assess and update benefits and costs; it is not the case, for example, that one study assumes that the propensity to commit a murder is determined by sociological and cultural factors whereas another does not. The new studies are also similar in that they all employ aggregate observational data on murder, punishment risks, and rich sets of covariates to evaluate deterrent effects. Despite these commonalities, estimates of deterrence effects vary dramatically and often are contradictory.
Why should studies using relatively similar conceptualizations of individual behavior and similar degrees of data aggregation produce disparate conclusions? A fundamental problem that underlies the disparate findings on the deterrent effect of death sentencing is that individual studies reflect specific assumptions about the appropriate data, control variables, functional form specification, etc. on the part of the researcher. As a result, two researchers each of whom has developed a conceptually reasonable and potentially correct "model" (by which we mean a collection of assumptions) can reach opposing conclusions. Typically, these differences in assumptions across models cannot be resolved by appeals to theory or to widely-endorsed statistical practice, because a priori each may be argued to be sensible in, at least, some circumstances. A posteriori, of course, evidentiary support may favor one model over another.
But even if the evidentiary support is quite lopsided, it is not the case that one naturally regards the probability that one set is true and the other false as either 100% or 0%.
− −
Our goal in this paper is to provide a constructive approach to addressing the model uncertainty that is found in the capital punishment literature. As we see it, the objective of deterrence studies is not to identify a best model of the murder process, but to communicate the information embodied in a data set on deterrence per se. How might this be done in practice? If the objective of the exercise is to communicate a single estimate of the deterrent effect of an execution (and an associated measure of the uncertainty of the estimate), then this should be done with explicit recognition of the model uncertainty present in the analysis. This leads us to employ model averaging methods.
In model averaging, the researcher treats the "true" model of a phenomenon as unknown.
The first step in the procedure is the formulation of a space of candidate models. This step involves judgment; there is no algorithm for determining what models should be considered.
Second, each model in the model space is estimated. Third, these estimated models are averaged, where the averaging weights represent the probabilities that each of the models is, in fact, the true one. This procedure in essence makes statistical claims that are conditional on a model space rather than on a particular model. One may take either a frequentist or a Bayesian approach to model averaging as its key features involve accounting for model uncertainty and are not predicated on a particular statistical philosophy. Our approach in this paper uses frequentist estimates; see Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004) , Hansen (2007) , and Hjort and Claesskens (2003) for discussion of statistical issues.
The model averaging approach was originally suggested in Leamer (1978) but has only recently reappeared in the statistics literature, where Draper (1995) provided a general conceptual argument in favor of model averaging. Also, work by Adrian Raftery (e.g. Raftery, Madigan, and Hoeting (1997) ) has been fundamental in making the approach operational. Model averaging has appeared in a number of social science settings, notably economics, examples include Brock and Durlauf (2001) , Sala-i-Martin, Miller (2004), Fernandez, Ley and Steel (2001) in studying economic growth determinants, and West (2003, 2007) and Levin and Williams (2003) for monetary policy evaluation.
Interestingly, the first wave of capital punishment/deterrence findings was also criticized for failing to account for model uncertainty. Specifically, Ehrlich's (1975 Ehrlich's ( , 1977 results were challenged by Baldus and Cole (1975) , Bowers and Pierce (1975) , Klein, Forst, and Filatov (1978) , Leamer (1983 ), McManus (1985 and Passell and Taylor (1977) on the grounds of fragility. Each of these critiques used methods to evaluate whether the results found were sensitive to the particular assumptions used in setting up the econometric study, so that different assumptions could succeed or fail to produce evidence of deterrence. A 1978 National Research
Council report reached the general conclusion that "available studies of [capital punishment] provide no useful evidence on the deterrent evidence of capital punishment" (Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin (1978) , pg. 9.)
Relative to our approach, Leamer's (1983) method is of particular interest. It represents an effort to systematically evaluate the interplay of model specification and deterrence findings.
By contrast, the bulk of studies responding to Ehrlich aimed at identifying alternative specifications to Ehrlich's that suggested no deterrence. Extreme bounds analysis was used to argue that Ehrlich's findings were not robust to model choice. Extreme bounds analysis treats a parameter estimate as fragile if its sign flips across model specifications. Our approach avoids using this method which, as argued in Brock, Durlauf and West (2003) , amounts to a very special view of how a policymaker should assess evidence; specifically the approach assumes that the policymaker possesses preferences such that if a policy may be counterproductive under any of the models that may characterize the data, then the policy should not be adopted. This means that the relative evidentiary support for different models is ignored in the assessment.
4 Ehrlich and Liu (1999) show that a number of propositions that receive essentially unanimous assent among economists as valid would be rejected using extreme bounds analysis on a sensible data set and group of candidate models. 5 Our approach should, therefore, be understood as incorporating Leamer's fundamental insight but extending it in different directions.
In exploring the role of model uncertainty in deterrence regressions, we are able to provide some adjudication of the disparate results in the literature. In particular, we will provide a variety of ways to understand the relationship between the different conclusions drawn by Dezhbakhsh, Rubin and Shepherd (2003) (denoted DRS) and Donohue and Wolfers (2005) (denoted DW). In doing this, we will conclude that the evidentiary support for a deterrence effect, in the data set under study and the model space spanned by these two papers, is weak.
This will be true in two complementary senses. First, model uncertainty renders calculations of net lives saved from executions very imprecise. While our point estimate of net lives saved from an additional execution is positive, we find that for approximately ¼ of the models we study, the deterrence effect is negative, i.e. more executions are associated with more homicides. Second, the signs of the relevant deterrence variables are in some cases inconsistent with the deterrence argument, thereby undermining its logic and leading to the possibility that the equilibrium effects of a capital punishment regime can raise the number of homicides.
It is important to recognize that our analysis is not designed to address criticisms of deterrence studies that focus on simply challenging a particular specification. For example, we do not question the validity of the instruments that are employed by DRS even though their validity has been subjected to critique by DW. The reason for this decision is that we wish to understand how model specification choices determine the different findings in the papers. In this sense, we take the behavioral assumptions implicit in the original DRS analysis seriously,
and ask to what extent their conclusions depend on details of the statistical instantiation of these assumptions. Arguments about instrumental variable validity typically function outside the logic of a given model. 6 As such, they rely on judgments that are outside the scope of our study.
This focus also means that we restrict our consideration of model uncertainty to the minimum amount needed to encompass DW and DRS. For example, we accept the DW decision to focus on differences between California, Texas and the rest of the United States rather than pursue a systematic examination of heterogeneity across all of the states. 7 Similarly, where DRS and DW coincide, as they do on most issues of measurement we employ their common assumptions, even though these may be problematic. For example, Cook and Ludwig (2006) argue that the percentage of suicide rate with guns is a better measure of gun access than NRA 6 In other work with Salvador Navarro and David Rivers, one of us (Durlauf) has found that the DRS instruments pass the Stock-Yogo overidentification test. So at least from this dimension, the DRS instruments are vindicated. Of course, this does not address arguments of the type made by DW that the instruments are a priori invalid. DW are in fact clear that they do not provide a formal test of validity. Rubin's (2006) reply to Donohue and Wolfers (2006) way that the latter is not. And it seems reasonable that a policymaker's assessment of the desirability of a policy can depend on the source of uncertainty about its impact.
Given the politically charged nature of any claim concerning capital punishment and deterrence, it is important to be explicit about what one can and cannot take from our analysis when considering capital punishment as a public policy. Our findings demonstrate that evidence for deterrence is weak in the context of a major data set and set of possible models of the murder process. Hence, in our judgment, claims of a strong deterrent effect made on the basis of these data and elements of the model set that we study, cannot be sustained and thus should not so be 8 We thank the anonymous referees for raising these issues and for the reference.
9 While we are studying how model averaging can be used to address measurement problems, we are not sure about how this would be done. We mention this as we wish to make clear that model averaging is a tool, not a panacea. Summary and conclusions appear in Section 6.
Model uncertainty and model averaging: general principles
We follow the discussion in Brock, Durlauf and West (2003) How should one describe evidence on a phenomenon such as deterrence when model uncertainty is present? Some intuition to our approach may be derived from considering the question of how to handle disagreements about heterogeneity in the objects studied in a data set. 12 One of the sources of the different findings in DRS and DW is the choice of data to use.
DW argue that excluding a single state, such as California or Texas, from the DRS data is a major source of the difference in findings (see, also, Berk (2005)). One can think of this disagreement as reflecting a simple form of model uncertainty in that the model space has only two elements: a set of data that includes California and Texas and one that does not. How do we propose adjudicating the disagreement? We argue that one should construct a weighted average of the results from each study, where the weights are model probabilities. 13 DRS can be interpreted as placing a prior probability of 1 on the model with data that includes California and
Texas whereas a researcher using DW would place a prior probability of 1 on the model without California and Texas. (To be clear, DW themselves do not endorse any particular model; rather they use it to illustrate the fragility of the claims in DRS.) Our approach recognizes that each model has information that is useful to a researcher.
More formally, the structure of model averaging may be understood as follows. Suppose one wishes to produce an estimate of some object of interest,δ , which measures the effects of a policy. In the context of the capital punishment literature, δ tends to be the coefficient on the 12 These types of disagreements can be formalized using the probabilistic notion of exchangeability, see Brock and Durlauf (2001) for discussion. 13 This can be thought of simply as the conditional probability that a given model describes the data. We discuss this at greater length below.
execution variable in some deterrence regression. Conventional statistical methods may be thought of as calculating an estimate that is model-specific,ˆm δ . In the model averaging approach, one attempts to eliminate conditioning on a specific model. To do this, one specifies a set or space of possible models M. The true model is, of course, unknown, so from the perspective of the researcher, each model will have some probability of being true. These probabilities depend on the relative goodness of fit of the different models given available data D as well as the prior beliefs of the researcher (something we discuss below); hence each model is associated with a posterior probability: ( )
. These posterior probabilities allow us to average the model-specific estimates to produce an estimate that accounts for the model uncertainty,
An associated variance estimate (due to Leamer (1978) ) is
The estimate ˆM δ thus accounts for the information contained in each specific model about δ and weights this information according to the likelihood the model is the correct one. Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) argue that the strategy of constructing estimates that are not model-dependent is the appropriate one when the objective of the statistical exercise is to evaluate alternative policy questions such as whether to implement capital punishment in a state.
Notice that this approach does not identify the "best" model; instead, it focuses entirely on estimating the effect of the policy, i.e. the parameter δ .
The variance formula (2) will therefore equal 0, it would of course be silly to conclude that the overall variance of the parameter estimate is 0, so long as there is any variation in ˆm δ . More generally, the cross-model variation in ˆM δ is a distinct source of uncertainty (as measured by the variance) that exists with respect to δ .
Notice that averaging across models means that a key role is played by the posterior model probabilities. Using Bayes' rule, the posterior probability may be rewritten as
The calculation of posterior model probabilities thus depends on two terms. The first, ( ) While this assumption may be criticized, (Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) , Doppelhofer and Weeks (2006)), for this context the assumption is a useful benchmark, and we follow it in our empirical implementation.
, is the probability of data given a model. This term ensures that models with greater evidentiary support receive greater weight in evaluating δ . An important difference with standard empirical work is that models with relatively weak evidentiary support are not ignored, even if they are downweighted. This represents a difference from most empirical work, which concentrates on first selecting a model, and second drawing inferences based on a parameter within the model. Model selection amounts to assigning a weight of 1 to a particular model given its superiority with respect to some goodness of fit criterion. This exaggerates the empirical salience of the model and thus can lead to inappropriate inferences.
Dezhbakhsh, Rubin and Shepherd versus Donohue and Wolfers
One of the most prominent papers arguing for the presence of a deterrent effect of capital punishment is the (2003) study by Dezhbakhsh, Rubin and Shepherd. This study is based on county-level data for the post-moratorium period (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) ; at the time it arguably represented the most detailed and disaggregate dataset to have been used to study deterrence and compares favorably with other data sets that have subsequently been used.
The DRS model is standard from the perspective of the choice-theoretic model of crime.
In the model, the murder rate is a function of three principal deterrence variables: the probability of arrest, the probability of receiving a death sentence conditional on being arrested, and the probability of being executed conditional on receiving a death sentence. The model includes controls for related crime variables including the aggravated assault rate and the robbery rate.
Demographic variables include information on population subsamples whose population shares may be correlated with higher levels of crime: the population proportion of 10-19 year olds and 20-29 year olds, percentages of blacks, percentages of non-black minorities, population density and the male population share. Income variables include real per capita income, real per capita income maintenance payments, and real per capita unemployment insurance payments. Finally, the specification includes the percentage of NRA members. These control variables are proxies for heterogeneity in murder rates across demographic groups, the opportunity cost of crime (proxied by various economic measures), as well as access to weapons. While one can naturally question the mapping between the empirical proxies and the actual determinants of murder, the variable choices reflect the constraints imposed by data availability and are in fact quite conventional. Formally, the DRS murder rate regression is , , 
Instruments resolve the simultaneity between (4) and (5)- (7). We follow DRS and DW in using two stage least squares. Instruments include police payroll, judicial expenditures, six partisan influence variables and prison admissions. As noted above, although one might have some concern over the use of these instruments, we take their validity as given while turning our attention to specification. 
15 DRS use a combination of county and state effects to predict county-level murder rates. We will not discuss the merits (or difficulties) of this type of estimation strategy other than to comment that it will not impact the model averaging exercise that we are conducting. in which the probability is based on the most recent year for which a death sentence occurred. Specifically, they show that certain modifications to the DRS statistical model can strongly affect their findings of a deterrence effect to capital punishment. First, they constrain the partisan influence variables in (5)- (7) so that rather than use six distinct regressors, which allow for each election to have a distinct effect on crime, they simply use the sum of the DRS variables as a single regressor. Second, they omit California and Texas from the analysis. These changes cause the sign of the estimated deterrent effect to reverse. That is, under this alternative specification, each execution is predicted to increase the number of murders. Table 1 summarizes the different assumptions in the two papers.
The differences between the DRS and DW findings illustrate how model uncertainty matters for substantive empirical claims, even when this uncertainty is predicated on a common social science theoretical structure. Each of these papers takes a particular stand on the instrumental variables to be employed and the inter-state comparability in the data under study.
At the same time, both studies use the same choice-theoretic approach to criminal behavior; however, the approach does not provide any theoretical guidance on the correct statistical model.
Because theory fails to identify the appropriate statistical specification, model averaging is thus a natural way to proceed.
Implementation issues a. data
With the exception of one variable based on data from the National Rifle Association, the data used in this analysis are publicly available from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, the California, Texas and the rest of the United States as a matter of variable inclusion, we proceed differently from DW. Rather than omit these states from the data under study, we construct variables that are the products of the deterrence variables and a dummy for California, and corresponding variables that are the products of the deterrent variables with a dummy for Texas.
Note that this approach to dealing with California and Texas is substantively different from DW in that the California and Texas data are retained and will affect all model parameter coefficients.
An advantage of our approach to modeling the DRS and DW differences for instrumental variables and Texas/California comparability is that the differences between the two papers can be interpreted as reflecting different assumptions about parameter heterogeneity and that further, the heterogeneity is modeled by including additional regressors in a baseline regression. Notice that from this perspective, DRS assume greater heterogeneity than DW in the deterrence variable equations, whereas DW assume greater heterogeneity in the crime equation.
Each candidate model is therefore defined as a choice of variables for the system of equations (4)-(7). Different instrumental variables generate different specifications of (5)- (7) 16 The DRS variable corresponding to the 1996 election is omitted. 
c. model weight calculation
Model weights are according to the selection of variables and model fit in the second stage regressions. Our calculation replicates Raftery (1995) so that ( )
17 Our procedure allows the possibility that one of the deterrence variables differs between a state (e.g. California) and the rest of the states, whereas the others are not allowed to so vary. This might seem odd in that one would expect heterogeneity to apply to all the deterrence variables or none. We therefore also considered a more 'limited' model space in which only 2 sets of variables enter the model space. The 2 variable sets are those that correspond to the 3 deterrence variables interacted with one of the state dummies. Thus, in this version, the space effectively includes 2 new 'elements', each of which consists of 3 variables. As the analyses with this limited model space did not vary in interesting ways from the analysis with the larger model space, we do not report a separate analysis for reasons of space.
where BIC is defined as
and p is the number of regressors, and 2 p R is the generalized measure of goodness of fit for instrumental variables regressions proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1994) .
Our model weights are chosen to provide a simple way of aggregating information across models. As such, our exercise is meant to illustrate the information on capital punishment in a particular data set and give an indication of how model specification affects that information.
There is, as far as we know, no formal analyses of model averaging for instrumental variables contexts that would provide a formal justification of the weights in terms of a formal Bayesian procedure, for example one with diffuse coefficient priors within models, as exists for ordinary least squares contexts. That said, the Pesaran and Smith goodness of fit measures do provide a consistent way of comparing choices of instrumental variables across models, and the BIC does provide a penalty for model complexity, so we believe the weights are sensible. We also note that we will report some properties of the model-specific estimates that do not use model weights; these produce qualitatively similar conclusions.
In interpreting our results, it is important to recognize that the distribution of the model averaged parameter estimates and associated standard errors cannot be formally equated with the sorts of distributions conventionally used to conduct hypothesis testing. Our focus is instead on whether standard error estimates are large compared to parameter estimates. Our rule of thumb in the discussion is that a standard error is small when it is less than ½ the absolute value of the associated parameter estimate, large otherwise. This roughly corresponds to the treatment of tstatistics greater than 2 as statistically significant; see Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) for discussion.
Results

a. averaging
Recall that DRS report deterrence findings for six different constructions (eq. 8-10) of the probability of execution given a death sentence. is not an artifact of their having reported a particularly unfavorable alternative specification relative to the DRS baseline.
Some additional evidence of the lack of firm deterrence evidence may be obtained from a consideration of the three deterrence parameters 1 δ (arrest probability), 2 δ (death sentence probability given arrest), and 3 δ (probability of execution given death sentence). In principle, the choice-theoretic logic underlying the murder rate regressions implies that each of parameters is negative. Our model-averaged estimates do not show any consistent finding of this type across categories. The signs of the coefficients vary across categories for all three deterrence parameters; the coefficient estimates are generally small compared to the standard errors.
Interestingly, the one exception to the imprecise coefficient estimates occurs for the arrest probability coefficient in columns 1-3, but here the coefficient is positive, which would mean that more arrests lead to more murders. Notice that columns 4 and 6, which were the cases where we found the strongest evidence that an execution saves net lives, the deterrence coefficients 1 δ and 2 δ do not have the expected signs (though each has a large standard error).
In fact, for none of the six columns do we find a case where all three deterrence variables have negative signs.
This absence of a pattern of deterrence coefficient estimates with negative signs not only illustrates the weakness of the evidence embodied in the data, but also indicates that overall estimate? Table 3 integrates the information across the DRS categories in order to produc effects of capital punishment on net lives saved may differ from the conventional calculation as described in footnote 7. The net lives saved calculations are made based on a transformation of the coefficient on the probability of an execution given the death sentence. But the equilibrium effect of capital punishment, as a policy regime, also depends on the effects on homicide of the probabilities of arrest and the probabilities of a death sentence. Positive coefficients imply that some aspects of the capital punishment regime raise the homicide rate, so one cannot make claims about overall effect of the regime. While we do not have a clear theory as to why these variables could have positive coefficients 18 , the absence of a causal explanation does little to mitigate the failure of the data to provide strong evidence that an overall deterrence effect is present.
How does the information in the various categories combine to produce an overall deterrence e overall estimates of the deterrence variables and the expected number of lives saved. In introducing this additional level of averaging, we use equal weights across the six categories rather than construct a new model space and then computing posterior model probabilities; this allows the easiest comparisons with Andreoni (1995) , anomalous results (from the perspective of the deterrence theory) can be produced. To be clear, these explanations are speculative-our findings are very much a black box. 19 Unequal weighting across categories would have "violated" the DRS and DW decision to treat the different ways of measuring the probability of execution given a death sentence as equally plausible.
each estimate and a positive sign for the overall estimate of 2 δ (death sentence likelihood given arrest), which, as emphasized above, is in contradiction to what theory predicts. Again, there does not exist a coherent pattern to the underlying deterrence oefficients that is consistent with the theoretical basis for the capital punishment effect.
As we have discussed, the differences between DRS and DW are generated by differences in instrumental variable choices and state c heterogeneity assumptions. In order to y matter for deterrence claims. The major difference between Table 2 and Table 4 is foun understand the roles of these two classes of assumptions, we repeat our averaging exercises focusing on two model subsets: one in which all states are used so that the only model uncertainty is generated by instrumental variable choice and a second where the original DRS instrumental variable structure retained in all models so that the only model uncertainty concerns the comparability of California and Texas with the rest of the country. These results are reported in Table 4 and are most usefully compared to Table 2 , the model averaging exercises which interact the two types of model uncertainty in producing the overall model space. As this comparison indicates, the weakness of evidentiary support for deterrence is preserved across both of the smaller model spaces. For both of our model space subset exercises, the net lives saved estimate is negative for columns 1 and 3, just as it is for the corresponding columns in Table 2 . Overall, the analysis of this section indicates that evidence of a capital punishment deterrent effect is overall weak. As indicated California and Texas with the rest of the country does not vitiate the strength of the DRS in Table 3 , the model averaged estimates of net lives saved are very imprecise, with a standard error nearly equal to the point estimate. When one allows for different constructions of Executions DeathSentences , as done in Table 2 , one even finds point estimates suggesting that an additional execution increases the homicide rate, and only 1 of 6 estimates is much larger than the asso error. Further, the model averaged point estimates are the opposite of that implied theoretically if the deterrence effect is present.
While imprecise, our point estimates of net lives saved are often large, for example 49 in Table 3 as opposed to 18, the number usually associated with DRS. In principle, one could argue that if a policymaker is risk neutral, the imprecision of the estimate is irrelevant so that ou ciated standard estimates of the deterrence parameters are also very imprecisely estimated, and in many cases r finding
In this section, we consider how deterrence estimates vary across the model space. Our cannot imagine a serious claim that the uncertainty associated with estimates of side effects is irrelevant to a decision in favor of approval. Similar considerations apply to capital punishment, and given the complex moral issues associated with it we believe it natural for a policymaker to tradeoff the strength of the deterrence effect against other desiderata. And the imprecision of our estimates implies that there is some probability that executions increase the murder rate, which is perfectly compatible with rational behavior on the part of criminals, e.g. witness elimination.
b. properties of the density of deterrence effects
discussion so far has focused on identifying "bottom th is of additional interest for several reasons.
The first reason why particular model estimates are interesting is that they can provide some insight on the relationship between DRS, DW and the model space that is defined by their differing assumptions. In Table 5 we compare DR space that provide the largest and smallest estimates of the deterrent effects. To be precise, Column 1 of Table 5 reports the smallest number of net lives saved for any specification we have studied, varying across all the models that are used in the Table 3 averages. Column 2 reports the results for the model with the largest number of net lives saved across all specifications. Column 3 reports the model with the largest posterior model probability of all those considered. Column 4 reports the DRS specification with the largest net lives saved per execution. This corresponds to column 3 of DRS (pages 362-363, Tables 3 and 4) . Column 5 provides a simple average of the DW findings. Recall from Table 1 that DW provide three variations on the 6 specifications of DRS. We average all 18 of these for the result in Column 5.
(We average the DW results since their focus was on the fragility of DRS, not promoting a particular alternate model.)
These results help place the differing conclusions of DRS and DW in context. They suggest that DRS's strong claims on deterrence are not the result of data mining per se; there is an alternative specification with far greater net lives saved estimates, and the most favorable model he relevant uncertainty associated with deterrence estimates among the limited set they considered is close, in terms of net lives saved, to the model with highest posterior weight of being true.
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Instead, the message of this comparison is that DRS's findings are driven by their having focused on a particular subset of plausible models.
However, when one expands the space of possible models to include a larger set of plausible ones, the evidence for deterrence is greatly weakened. These additional models contain additional information about deterrence. We would also note that a comparison of Column 1 with Column 5 illustrates that the DW analysis did not focus on outlier models in the sense that Column 1 illustrates a far larger increase in murders from deterrence than the DW average; this may also be seen in Figure 2 below.
A second reason why the density of deterrence effects across the model space is important is that it provides relevant information when a policymaker is risk averse; standard errors generally do not fully reflect t when preferences are not quadratic. The model with the greatest posterior is based on the construction of Executions DeathSentences corresponding to Table 2 , Column 5. It includes five of the six interacted deterrent variables; the exception is the California dummy interacted with the probability of death sentence given arrest. Finally, Table 6 provides results on cumulated model probabilities and associated deterrence effects; the Table thus provides aggregate statistics based on the histogram in Figure   1 . As the Table indicates , the probability that an additional execution in r more is 15% whereas the probability that an additional execution decreases the murder rate by 20 or more is 47%. This reflects the asymmetry in the histogram in Figure 1 . Of particular interest are the probabilities for values near 0. The probabilities for models that are associated with net lives saved of 5 and fewer is approximately 1/3. So, while the DRS estimate of 18 is relatively close to (and indeed smaller than) the median of the histogram, 24, there is substantial uncertainty about the actual deterrence level.
Conclusions
theory, economi st th rder rate, to use a phrase of Brock and Durlauf (2001) , means that theory cannot be a precise guide to statistical specification; model uncertainty is intrinsic to such studies (cf. Fagan (2006)). Given that the goal of such exercises is the measurement of a particular policy effect, i.e. the relationship between capital punishment and the murder rate, as opposed to the construction of a model of the murder rate per se, model averaging methods are a natural way to make empirical claims robust to the details of model specification. The model averaging approach indicates how one can understand and resolve disparate empirical findings. Our application to the analyses of DRS and DW leads us to support the conclusion that DRS claims about strong deterrence effects are an artifice of particular model choices. On the other hand, we do not find evidence in support of the suggestion that the death penalty raises the homicide rate, which one could take from some of the DW regressions (but which the authors did not).
The bottom line of our empirical analysis is that the measure of the number of lives saved per execution is large (weighted average estimate of 36) but imprecisely estimated (weighted average standard deviation 26). An analysis of the behavior of deterrence estimates ac e mu ross the odel m space indicates that while the aggregate probability associated with models that produce a deterrent effect is .72, the individual estimates vary widely and include a nontrivial probability that there are large increases in homicide associated with executions (probability .15 of 20 or more homicides.) These conclusions may seem frustrating, since they make clear that our conclusion is not that there is no deterrent effect present, but rather that inferences on its magnitude are so imprecise to make representation of strong claims impossible and also irresponsible. But this should not be surprising. As noted by Berk (2005) , the analysis of capital punishment and deterrence is naturally delimited by the infrequency of executions for all but a handful of states; in particular, uncertainty about the comparability of Texas to other states naturally produces uncertainty about the overall deterrence estimate given the concentration of executions in that state. The deterrence claim may seem somewhat strengthened by the fact that the posterior model probabilities for those specifications that produce a positive estimate of net lives saved is .72, but in isolation this is a weak piece of evidence since it does not reflect the magnitudes of deterrent effects for those models, let alone the magnitudes for those models where the estimate of net lives saved is negative. It is also important to keep in mind that the weakness of the evidentiary support for deterrence that emerges in our exercise emerges in a context that delimits the model uncertainty in many ways. For example, while we address the issue of the comparability of California and Texas to the rest of the country, we do not address broader issues of the comparability of interstate or intercounty data.
The substantial uncertainty we find associated with deterrence estimates is naturally of importance in moving from positive to normative discussions of the death penalty. Figures such as the expected number of lives saved per execution, or the probability that the deterrence effect of cap to deal ital punishment is positive do not, by themselves, provide guidance as to how a policymaker should use these numbers when comparing policy choices. Should a policymaker care whether the conditional probability density under a capital punishment regime is sensitive to what seem to be uninteresting assumptions, such as the choice of instrumental variables? Does a policymaker wish to implement capital punishment, knowing that for a set of a priori plausible models, the expected number of murders will increase under the policy? We do not propose answers to these questions, but simply observe that these questions are fundamental to the assessment of capital punishment as a public policy. At a minimum, it seems obvious that a policymaker's preferences might contain a risk aversion component that is relevant when assessing deterrent effects. In fact, there are reasons to believe that policymakers might want to treat model uncertainty differently from other types of uncertainty when assessing policy effects.
One reason may be that the policymaker's preferences embody ambiguity aversion, which means that the policymaker has a specific distaste for the least favorable outcome in an uncertain environment beyond its role in affecting expected value calculations. These types of preferences may be related to efforts to develop non-Bayesian approaches to decisionmaking. 21 For our purposes, they suggest that simply computing expected deterrence effects is inadequate.
Further progress in evaluating deterrence, in our view, therefore requires the consideration of questions of criminal policy evaluation in light of the types of information limitations we have discussed. Such an analysis will, to be credible, necessarily have 21 This type of work has become important in macroeconomics, see Hansen and Sargent (2007) for a brilliant general exposition; Brock, Durlauf and West (2003) and Brock, Durlauf, Nason, and Rondina (2007) explore policy evaluation issues. Hansen and Sargent defend the use of minimax evaluation on the part of a decisionmaker. Other proposals include the use of minimax regret (Brock, Durlauf, Nason, Rondina (2007) Durlauf (2006) and Gaus (2006) among other places; the former paper's analysis of racial profiling has parallels to the capital punishment issue. From the perspective of policy evaluation, the conclusion of National
Research Council Report (Blumstein, Cohen and Nagin (1978) ) thus still seems appropriate:
Our conclusion about the current evidence does not imply that capital punishment should or should not be imposed. The deterrent effectiveness of capital punishment is only one consideration among many in the decision regarding the likely to dominate the inevitable crude estimates of the deterrent effect. (p. 9)
22 Sunstein and Vermeule's (2005) analysis focuses on evaluating capital punishment when it leads to a reduction of the murder rate, and does not discuss the appropriate levels of risk or ambiguity aversion on the part of the policymaker. They also largely ignore any competing ethical claims on policy choices. 0.08 (5.1) Estimation is by two-stage least squares. Controls in the homicide equation include the assault rate; the robbery rate; real per capita personal income; real per capita unemployment insurance payments; real per capita income maintenance payments; population density; the proportion of the population aged 10-19, 20-29; black, white, or other; male or female; state NRA membership. Instruments include state-level police payroll, judicial expenditures, Republican vote shares, and prison admissions. Standard errors are in parentheses. Net lives saved evaluated for a state with the characteristics of the average death penalty state in 1996. Column 1 corresponds to the smallest number of lives saves, column 2 to the largest, and column 3 to the model with the largest posterior. The DRS results with the largest number of lives saved is shown in column 4 and the average of the DW results is shown in column 5. The model with the smallest deterrent effect includes all control variables and all CA and TX interaction dummies except the CA dummy interacted with the probability of arrest, using the sixth definition for Executions DeathSentences defined in the text (Column 6 from Table 2 ). The largest deterrent effect occurs for the model includes all control variables and only the TX interaction with the execution variable, using the first definition for Executions DeathSentences above (Column 1 from Table 2 ). The model with the greatest posterior includes all variables from the full specification except the CA dummy interacted with the probability of death sentence given arrest, and uses the fifth definition above (Column 5 from Table 2 ). Model probabilities are calculated as specified in the text. Each model generates a coefficient for probability of execution conditional on a death sentence and an associated net lives saved value. Results for this exercise use the full model space as specified in the text. Each column indicates the percentage of summed model probabilities for all models which produced at least as many net lives saved as indicated in the first row of the column, e.g. the posterior probability of those models producing a net increase in deaths greater than 20 for an additional execution is .15 whereas the posterior probability of those model producing a net decrease in deaths of 20 or greater is .53. 
